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Abstract—We study the design of pricing schemes for a group of consumers with smart meters (e.g., in a 
Greenfield area) who are connected through a gateway to a traditional electricity greed with a progressive tariff. 
Because the progressive tariff cannot take into account the time aspect of electricity demands, we apply it to 
consumers in both an individual and a group basis over a shorter time period, which can flatten the overall 
demand over time and thereby reduce peak load. This scenario for the coexistence of traditional and smart girds 
and the pricing schemes under this scenario can enable smooth migration to a future smart grid. 
Keywords- smart grid; pricing scheme; progressive tariff; consumer grouping. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Smooth migration from a current electricity grid to a 
future smart grid has been the major focus of researches 
in Academia, Industry, and Government: The large 
investments needed for the augmentation of power grid 
and the installation of two-way communication 
infrastructures could be a major barrier for roll-out of 
smart grid by power utilities, while the privacy issues 
related with the power-usage data exchanged between 
the consumer and the power utility has become a major 
concern for consumers in adopting smart grid 
technologies [1]. To overcome these barriers and issues 
in migrating to a smart grid, the UK government outlines 
three phases of smart grid development [2]. Arian et al. 
separate smart metering and smart grid infrastructures 
and suggest intelligent migration strategies from smart 
metering to smart grid [3]. 
These works clearly show that the migration to a 
future smart grid should take a step-wise or phased 
approach and that it may take long time to completely 
replace a traditional grid with a smart grid in a national 
scale. This means that we need to prepare for the 
coexistence of a traditional grid and a smart grid for a 
long period of time in the migration to a future smart 
grid. 
In this paper we take one of coexistence scenarios, 
where a group of consumers with smart meters (e.g., in a 
Greenfield area) are connected through a gateway to a 
traditional electricity greed with a progressive tariff, and 
study how to design pricing schemes based on the 
progressive tariff that can flatten the overall demand 
over time and thereby reduce peak load. 
II. DESIGNING PRICING SCHEMES BASED ON 
PROGRESSIVE TARIFF AND CONSUMER GROUPING 
A. A System Model 
Fig. 1 shows a system model for the coexistence of a 
traditional electricity grid and a smart grid, which we 
base our discussions on. The gateway, connecting the 
two grids, receives electricity and progressive tariff 
information from the traditional grid, while interacting 
with smart meters at customer premises through the bi-
directional communication links for efficient power 
distribution and intelligent billing based on real-time 
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Figure 1.  A system model for the coexistance of a traditional electricity grid and a smart grid. 
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usage monitoring. From the point of view of the 
traditional grid, the gateway functions as a traditional 
electricity meter for a virtual consumer who represents 
the group of consumers with smart meters; from the 
point of view of the smart grid, on the other hand, the 
gateway works as a utility control center in a typical 
smart grid [4]. 
Under a progressive tariff, a consumer’s electricity 
bill is calculated based on multiple progressive levels 
according to its power consumption [5]. For instance, 
consider the monthly progressive tariff for residential 
consumers by Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO) summarized in Table I [6]. 
 
TABLE I.  ELECTRIC RATES FOR RESIDENTIAL (LOW-VOLTAGE) 
CUSTOMERS BY KEPCO [6] 
Consumption Range 
[kWh] 
Energy Charge 
(KRW
a
/kWh) 
Tier 1 ~ 100 60.7 
Tier 2 201-200 125.9 
Tier 3 201-300 187.9 
Tier 4 301-400 280.6 
Tier 5 401-500 417.7 
Tier 6 500 ~ 709.5 
 
a. Korean Won 
 
If monthly power consumption for a family is 350 
kWh, the price (in KRW) is determined as follows:
1
 
 
100 ∙ 60.7 + 100 ∙ 125.9 + 100 ∙ 187.9 + 50 ∙ 280.6
= 51480 
 
Unlike advanced pricing schemes based on time-
based metering (e.g., time-of-use (TOU) price scheme 
[5]), the progressive tariff cannot take into account the 
dynamic nature of usage patterns in a shorter time scale 
(e.g., an hour). The progressive tariff, however, can 
provide incentives for consumers to change their usage 
patterns over the whole billing period (e.g., a month) by 
rewarding savings and penalizing higher consumption 
[7], which is the reason it becomes popular as a 
residential pricing scheme in several countries including 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the US [8]. 
B. Progressive Tariff over Time Slots with Consumer 
Groupting 
Smart grid technologies provide advanced real-time 
usage monitoring based on smart meters and the 
interaction between the utility and consumers through 
bi-directional communication links in determining actual 
consumption of electricity. Based on such capabilities, 
the utility can offer dynamic and cost-reflective tariffs 
which take into account not only the consumption of 
electricity by consumers but also the generation of 
electricity by the utility and/or distributed energy 
sources in a microgrid [2], [4]. In the coexistence 
scenario described in Sec. II.A, however, we cannot 
                                                          
1 Standing and demand charges are excluded for simplicity. 
expect such dynamic tariff information from the utility 
in the traditional grid; instead, the gateway should 
provide an internal pricing scheme for the consumers in 
the smart grid based on the external, static pricing 
scheme (i.e., progressive tariff) from the utility. 
Here we discuss how to enable the design of such a 
dynamic pricing scheme for the internal smart grid. Fig. 
2 illustrates two key ideas — i.e. (1) the adaptation of 
the progressive tariff for a shorter time period (i.e., 6-
hour time slots in these examples) and (2) grouping of 
consumers in applying the progressive tariff — through 
daily usage pattern examples of two consumers and the 
monthly progressive tariff by KEPCO described in 
Table I. 
Note that the energy consumption range of each tier 
has been adjusted according to the change in a time 
period. For instance, the maximum value for Tier 1 
needs to be scaled down for a 6-hour time slot as follows 
(assuming 30 days per month): 
 
100 ×
1
30
×
6
24
= 0.8333 (𝑘𝑊ℎ) 
 
Fig. 2 (a) and (b) show an original and a modified 
daily usage patterns of two consumers, respectively. If 
we apply the progressive tariff adjusted for a 6-hour time 
slot to each consumer individually (i.e., the graphs on 
the left side of the figure), there is no incentive for 
demand response (i.e., shifting the usage to other time 
slots) from Consumer 2 because the structure of the 
progressive tariff (i.e., the range and the energy charge 
for each tier) is static and not varying over time 
depending on the consumption and the supply of 
electricity. In fact, assuming that the same daily usage 
patterns repeat over the whole month, the prices for the 
usage patterns shown in Fig. 2 under the progressive 
tariff over the 6-hour time slot are higher than those 
under the original monthly progressive tariff: For the 
former, the rates for Tier 1 through 3 are used in price 
calculation, while for the latter, only the rate for Tier 1 is 
used. 
Once we group the consumers together and apply the 
progressive tariff to the group in a collective manner
2
, 
however, we can provide incentives for demand 
response. Fig. 2 (b) shows that usages of Consumer 2 for 
two consecutive time slots belong to Tier 1 by consumer 
grouping, while they spread over both Tier 1 and 2 
without such grouping. This benefit of consumer 
grouping is similar to that of resource sharing in 
networking area [9]: The unused resource by inactive 
users (i.e., the amount of electricity belonging to Tier 1 
which is not used by Consumer 1) is reallocated to 
active users (i.e., Consumer 2) through resource sharing. 
C. Allocation of Group Price to Individual Consumers 
Under the consumer grouping, determining the 
prices for individual consumers becomes an important 
                                                          
2
 Compared to the ranges for the individual application, the ranges are 
scaled up this time by the number of consumers (i.e., 2). 
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issue: Because the group price for a given time slot 
under the consumer grouping is not equal to the sum of 
individual prices in general, it is a challenge how to 
allocate this group price to each consumer. Fig. 3 
illustrates the issue of price allocation under the 
consumer grouping, which compares the total prices of 
individual and group pricing schemes for three 
consumers for a 6-hour time slot. As shown in the 
figure, the total price under the group pricing scheme 
(i.e., 466.50 KRW) is less than that of the individual 
pricing scheme (i.e., 518.16 KRW). 
One possible allocation strategy is a proportional 
allocation (e.g., as in [10]), where the total price under 
the group pricing scheme is allocated to consumers 
proportional to their individual prices under the 
individual pricing scheme. According to the proportional 
allocation, the price (in KRW) for each consumer in the 
example shown in Fig. 3 is obtained as follows: 
 Consumer 1: 466.50 × (312.08/518.16) = 280.97 
 Consumer 2: 466.50 × (155.50/518.16) = 140.00 
 Consumer 3: 466.50 × (50.58/518.16) = 45.54 
D. Scheduling of Energy Consumption 
With the proposed pricing scheme (including the 
allocation of group price), the remaining challenge is 
how to schedule energy consumption of each consumer 
to maximize its saving. 
Unlike the traditional grid, thanks to the bi-
directional communication links shown in Fig. 1, the 
gateway can disseminate to all consumers in the smart 
grid the information on the consumption status of not 
only the whole group but also individual consumers in 
real time. Based on this information, each consumer can 
adjust (i.e., schedule) its energy consumption for a time 
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Figure 2.  Progressive tariff over 6-hour time slot applied for (a) an original and (b) a modified (i.e., Consumer 2) daily usage patterns. 
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period, typically longer than the period of time slot (e.g., 
a day). 
Note that the implementation of energy consumption 
scheduling is beyond the scope of this paper and 
deserves a separate publication. Interested readers are 
referred to [4] and the references therein (especially 
[11]) for the game-theoretic approaches for this topic. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have reported the current status of 
our research on designing pricing schemes based on 
progressive tariff and consumer grouping for a 
coexistence scenario in the migration to a future smart 
grid. To design a pricing scheme which is compatible 
with the existing progressive scheme in the traditional 
grid but can flatten the overall demand over time and 
thereby reduce peak load, we have proposed the 
application of a progressive tariff over a time slot to a 
group of consumers in a collective manner. We have 
also discussed the issue of price allocation under the 
proposed pricing scheme and provided an example of 
proportional allocation. 
It is worth mentioning that with the proposed 
approaches, the static progressive tariff can be converted 
to a viable pricing scheme for a smart grid that is 
connected to a traditional electricity grid, which can 
provide monetary incentives for consumers to shift their 
consumption from congested time slots. 
Note that the design of demand side management 
schemes including demand response and more advanced 
price allocation strategy for the proposed pricing scheme 
are two major topics for further study. 
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Figure 3.  Comparison of total prices in (a) individual and (b) 
group pricing schemes. 
